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Disclosure-Protected Inference with Linked Microdata
Using a Remote Analysis Server
James O. Chipperfield1
Large amounts of microdata are collected by data custodians in the form of censuses and
administrative records. Often, data custodians will collect different information on the same
individual. Many important questions can be answered by linking microdata collected by
different data custodians. For this reason, there is very strong demand from analysts, within
government, business, and universities, for linked microdata. However, many data custodians
are legally obliged to ensure the risk of disclosing information about a person or organisation
is acceptably low. Different authors have considered the problem of how to facilitate reliable
statistical inference from analysis of linked microdata while ensuring that the risk of
disclosure is acceptably low. This article considers the problem from the perspective of an
Integrating Authority that, by definition, is trusted to link the microdata and to facilitate
analysts’ access to the linked microdata via a remote server, which allows analysts to fit
models and view the statistical output without being able to observe the underlying linked
microdata. One disclosure risk that must be managed by an Integrating Authority is that one
data custodian may use the microdata it supplied to the Integrating Authority and statistical
output released from the remote server to disclose information about a person or organisation
that was supplied by the other data custodian. This article considers analysis of only binary
variables. The utility and disclosure risk of the proposed method are investigated both in a
simulation and using a real example. This article shows that some popular protections against
disclosure (dropping records, rounding regression coefficients or imposing restrictions on
model selection) can be ineffective in the above setting.
Key words: Confidentiality; remote analysis; record linkage; statistical disclosure control.
1. Introduction
Large amounts of microdata are collected by data custodians in the form of censuses and
administrative sources. Often, data custodians will collect different information on the
same individual. Many important questions can be answered by linking microdata
collected by different data custodians. For this reason, there is very strong demand from
analysts, within government, business and universities, for linked microdata. However,
many data custodians are legally obliged to ensure the risk of disclosing information about
a person or organisation is acceptably low. For simplicity, in the rest of this article it is
assumed that there are only two data custodians and the linked microdata are the result of
linking two sets of microdata collected by the two data custodians. Potential analysts of
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the linked microdata are the two data custodians and noncustodians (e.g., academics,
members of the public). There are two reasons the disclosure risks are significantly greater
if an analyst of the linked microdata is also a data custodian. First, because data custodians
commonly collect name and address, any additional information that can be inferred about
a record on the microdata it collected, can be directly associated with the person who
provided it. Second, a data custodian can use information on the linked microdata
collected to disclose information about a person or organisation on the linked microdata
that was collected by the other data custodian.
There has been some work in the literature on managing the disclosure risks from
analysts who are also data custodians. When unique identifiers, such as name and address,
are available, record linkage techniques (see Herzog et al. 2007) are frequently used to
identify records belonging to the same individual. Secure Record Linkage (SRL) (see, for
example, Churches and Christen 2004) suggests a way in which a third party can link
microdata without each data custodian disclosing the identity of nonlinked records to the
other data custodian and without the data custodians revealing any sensitive information to
the third party. The data custodians attach a unique record identifier to their microdata
(e.g., random number) and agree on a common way of encrypting the linking variables,
which are sent to the third party to perform the record linkage. The third party links the
microdata and returns the record identifiers of the linked pairs to the data custodians.
Therefore, each data custodian could identify the names and addresses of the people who
were linked, which in turn could disclose sensitive information (e.g., knowing a person’s
record has been linked to an unemployment register discloses the person is unemployed).
For many data custodians, such as the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), revealing
such information would be a breach of their legal obligations and would mean that SRL is
not a viable option. If instead the third party was allowed access to linking variables (e.g.,
name and address), the linkage could be of much higher quality, since clearly unencrypted
linking variables are more useful in identifying matches than encrypted linking variables.
It would be interesting to study the extent to which encryption of linking variables reduces
the quality of the linkage.
Once the linked pairs are determined, each data custodian will need to ensure that any
statistical output from the linked microdata has an acceptable disclosure risk. Secure
computation algorithms allow data custodians to compute matrix operations, such as those
involved in regression, from linked microdata without sharing individual records (see, for
example, Karr et al. 2009). Among the major limitations of this approach are that it relies
on SRL, allows only datacustodians to analyse the microdata (i.e., non-data custodians
cannot perform analysis) and that it is currently limited to a certain set of models.
Alternatively, Kohnen and Reiter (2009) consider the novel problem of how data
custodians, without sharing sensitive variables, can together produce synthetic linked
microdata for public use. Limitations of this approach are that synthetic data can be time
consuming to produce and that it can be hard to guarantee that the synthetic data do not
distort some important relationships.
In contrast to the above approaches discussed in the literature, this article considers a
more practical and straightforward approach to managing disclosure risk from linked
microdata. In particular, this article considers the presence of a so-called Integrating
Authority (IA) that is trusted to perform the following roles:
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1. Link microdata collected by two data custodians.
2. Maximise the inherent utility or value of the linked microdata. This may include
application of consistent standards and classifications, statistical editing and
imputation.
3. Allow analysts to access the linked microdata in order to fit models.
4. Ensure the level of disclosure risk of the regression output is acceptable to the data
custodians.
The IA is allowed to observe the microdata collected by the data custodians. The data
custodians do not mask the microdata they provide to the IA in any way. The data
custodians not only have access to the microdata they provided to the IA but, as analysts,
they also have access to the regression output released by the Integrating Authority.
There are at least three benefits to an IA. First, the IA manages the complexity involved
in linking microdata and managing disclosure risk – this is important since many data
custodians do not have the specialised capability in, for example, standardising linking
fields, editing and imputation, record linkage and data access. Second, since the IA
observes the linking fields, it is possible to conduct a clerical review on the set of links and
to refine the method of record linkage. This essential task appears impractical when
linking fields are encrypted. Third, a more optimal trade-off between disclosure risk and
the utility of the analysis is possible. With an IA, only the disclosure risk of the regression
output needs to be managed; under the alternatives mentioned above, the disclosure risk
must be managed from record linkage to construction of the regression output itself.
There are some major potential disadvantages of the IA framework. First, some data
custodians may be prohibited by law, from disclosing information to any another
organisation. This would mean the IA framework would not apply. Second, fulfilling the
role of an IA is potentially a costly exercise. This may lead the IA to pass this cost burden
onto analysts by charging a substantial fee for access. Moreover, it is the IA that decides
how to fulfil its roles in any given situation. For example, the IA decides which variables to
include on the linked microdata and how analysts will access the linked microdata (e.g.,
public use file or via a remote server, as discussed below). These decisions may suit some
analysts but not others.
Once the record linkage step is completed by the IA, its next step is to facilitate access to
the microdata. In this article, the IA releases regression output via a remote analysis server
(see Reiter 2002, Gomatam et al. 2005, Sparks et al. 2008, Lucero and Zayatz 2010).
A simple model for a remote server is:
1. An analyst submits a query, via the Internet, to the analysis server.
2. The analysis server processes the analyst’s query on the linked microdata. The
statistical output (e.g., regression coefficients) is modified or restricted in order to
ensure the risk of disclosure is acceptably low.
3. The analysis server sends the modified output, via the Internet, to the analyst.
One key protection against disclosure afforded by remote analysis is that the analyst
is restricted from viewing the microdata. However, an analyst may attempt to use the
regression output to infer the value of variables on the linked microdata. Such attempts are
commonly called data attacks. Once the value of these variables is inferred, the attacking
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analyst can attempt one of the well-understood methods of disclosure (e.g., attribute
disclosure through linkage); for a review see Shlomo (2007). The IA can provide analysts
with disincentives to conducting attacks in the first place. For example, analysts could be
required to sign confidentiality agreements to access to the remote server. If the agreement
is violated by an analyst, access to the server could be revoked.
This article is about how an IA can manage the risk of a data custodian successfully
attacking the linked microdata. A data custodian’s attack would involve using the
microdata it supplied to the IA and the regression output released by the remote server to
infer the value of variables about a person or organisation that were collected by the other
data custodian. Data custodians will commonly collect name and address, which means if
such an attack is successful, the value of any variables that are inferred could be directly
attributed to the person or organisation who provided that information. In other words,
disclosure occurs automatically after a successful attack.
The problem of managing the disclosure risk of regression output released via a remote
server has been the subject of significant recent attention in the literature. The literature on
this problem focuses on the situation where there is a single data custodian responsible for
managing access to its microdata (i.e., unlinked microdata). In the case of remote analysis
for model fitting, most effort has been directed at linear regression. Gomatam et al. (2005)
considered imposing restrictions to stop analysts reconstructing coefficients for a sensitive
linear model, an example of which is a model with highly accurate predictions of a
sensitive characteristic (see Bleninger et al. 2010 for an empirical investigation). Taking
a completely opposite approach, Dwork and Smith (2009) describe the concept of
differential privacy, which imposes no restrictions but instead relies on perturbation of
statistical output alone to manage the disclosure risk. Many authors have considered
imposing both restrictions and perturbation (e.g., Sparks et al. 2008); this article takes such
an approach. One limitation of a remote server is that analysts are restricted to using the set
of statistical analysis procedures that are supported by the remote server. This article only
briefly mentions the more moderate disclosure risk of attacks made by noncustodians
since, as mentioned, there is a considerable literature on this problem.
Section 2 describes how a data custodian may attack the linked microdata when the
remote server naively releases standard regression output for models that are fitted to
binary data. Section 3 proposes simple protections that an IA can implement in a remote
server to reduce the success rate of these attacks. Section 4 evaluates the utility and
disclosure risk of the proposed approach in a real situation and in a simulation. Section 5
makes some final comments.
2. Attacks Without Any Protection
This section describes how a data custodian can attack the linked microdata if the remote
server naively releases standard regression output. Consider an IA linking microdata
collected by two data custodians, referred to as A and T. Data Custodian A is the attacker
and Data Custodian T is the target.
This article makes the assumption that all links between records are correct (i.e., each
pair of records that are linked correspond to the same person or organisation) and that the
name and address of all linked records are known to Data Custodian A. In practice, linkage
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is rarely perfect and it is well known that errors arising during the linkage process provide
some level of protection against disclosure (see Ch. 18 in Herzog et al. 2007). From the
perspective of managing disclosure risk, the assumption that linkage errors do not arise
is conservative.
Many authors distinguish between variables that are sensitive (e.g., income) and those
that are not sensitive, where only the risk of disclosing sensitive variables needs to be
managed. However, the legislation that guides how the Australian Bureau of Statistics, and
many other data custodians, manages disclosure risk does not distinguish between
sensitive and nonsensitive variables.
Let D be a set of records from the linked microdata comprising n records: a binary
outcome variable y and a vector of K binary covariates x. For the ith record, define ð yi; xiÞ
where xi ¼ ðx1i; x2i; : : : ; xki; : : : ; xKiÞ
0 and i ¼ 1; : : : ; n. Data Custodian T collected
y and the KT column vector xT and Data Custodian A collected the KA column vector





0Þ0 and K ¼ KT þ KA. In other words, if we define X ¼
ðXT ;XAÞ ¼ ðx1; : : : ; xi; : : :xnÞ
0, Data Custodian T supplied y ¼ ð y1; : : : ; yi; : : : ; ynÞ
0
and the n £ KT matrix XT and Data Custodian A collected the n £ KA matrix XA.
Therefore we may now write D ¼ ðy;XÞ.
An attack by Data Custodian A involves using regression output released by the remote
server and XA to infer the value of one or more elements of ðy;XT Þ. Therefore, for the
purposes of this article, if a variable on the linked microdata is collected by both data
custodians (e.g., a linking variable), it is defined as a covariate in xA.
In general, a good strategy for Data Custodian A’s attack on a record involves ensuring
xA, used in the calculation of the statistical output, uniquely identifies the target record on
the linked microdata. This ensures there is 1–1 mapping between the target record’s value
of xA and name and address. As Data Custodian A collected XA, this could readily be
achieved.
Noncustodians present much less of a disclosure risk. Firstly, since they do not have
access to XA, they can only use the statistical output released by the remote server in an
attack. Secondly, even if an attack was able to reconstruct ð yj; xjÞ, attributing the jth record
to a person or organisation is more difficult without name and address (see Skinner and
Shlomo 2008).
Subsections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 describe attacks using standard regression output, including
estimates of regression coefficients, estimates of their variance and test statistics,
respectively.
2.1. Regression Coefficients
The standard estimate of the regression coefficient b for models fitted to binary variables
(e.g., logistic regression, linear regression), denoted by b̂, is obtained by solving the score
equation
Scðb;DÞ ¼ 0; ð1Þ
where ScðbÞ ¼ Six
0
ið yi 2 miÞ and mi ¼ gðx
0
ibÞ for some link function g. It is well known
that fitting a model toD is equivalent to fitting a model to the C counts contained in the
vector n, where n ¼ {nc : c ¼ 1; : : : ;C} and nc is the number of records belonging to the
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cth pattern in ð y; xÞ (see McCullagh and Nelder 1989). As an aside, if y was instead a
multinomial response with M categories, the appropriate score function would involve
M 2 1 equations of the form of (1). A multinomial response model fits into the framework
developed here, but for simplicity we do not consider it further.
This section shows how Data Custodian A can attack ðy;XT Þ – this involves using
b̂ and XA in an attempt to infer the value of one or more elements of ðy;XT Þ.
2.1.1. Solving the Estimating Equations from a Single Model
Consider Data Custodian A substituting b̂ into (1) and then attempting to solve for some
elements of ðy;XT Þ. If the number of patterns in xA is CA, Data Custodian A’s attack can
exploit the following:
1. The K constraints imposed by b̂ through (1)
2. Knowledge of XA
3. ðy;XT Þ has only binary elements.
This attack can be as simple as conducting a grid search. Other more sophisticated search
techniques could also be used. Of course this search could be more targeted if, for instance,
Data Custodian T were to release frequency counts of y or xT to the public. For example,
the ABS, as potential Data Custodian T, releases frequency counts from its Census
microdata after the counts have been perturbed by a small amount.
2.1.2. Solving Estimating Equations from Multiple Models
This attack involves fitting different models to the same set of data values inD (i.e., the
same set of records and variables) by:
1. Changing the dependent variable
2. Changing the link function (e.g., linear, logistic and probit)
3. Transforming variables (e.g., creating an interaction term).
The regression coefficients for each fitted model impose additional constraints on ðy;XT Þ
via (1). The idea behind this attack is to impose sufficient constraints so that Data
Custodian A can solve for one or more elements of ðy;XT Þ.
Example 1: Solving for all unknowns. Denote the data values in D by
Z ¼ ðX; yÞ ¼ ðz1; : : : ; zi; : : : ; znÞ
0, where zim to be the mth element of zi. Consider
Data Custodian A fitting the mth model where the outcome variable for the ith record is
yðmÞi ¼ zim and the covariate for the ith record is x
ðmÞ
i , which is obtained by dropping zim
from zi. Denote the standard estimate of the regression coefficients from the mth model
by b̂ ðmÞ and denote m̂ðmÞi ¼ gðx
ðmÞ0
i b̂
ðmÞÞ. Data Custodian A’s attack involves solving for one
or more elements of ðy;XT Þ given XA, b̂







i Þ ¼ 0; ð2Þ
for m ¼ 1; : : : ;M. Clearly, as M increases so does the number of constraints.
Example 2: Solving for unknowns in one estimating equation. Continuing Example 1,
consider the lth estimating equation in (2) when Data Custodian A fits M models such
that yðmÞi ¼ yi and the lth element of x
ðmÞ
i is by definition xil, for all m ¼ 1; : : : ;M.
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Further consider that Data Custodian A collected xl so that it knows which H ¼ Sixil
records contribute to the lth estimating equation. The constraint imposed by the lth




for m ¼ 1; : : : ;M. This imposes M constraints on the H £ ðKT þ 1Þ unknowns for the
H records contributing to the lth estimating equation. This number of unknowns could
be considerably less than Example 1. An extreme example is when H ¼ 1, which means
there are ðKT þ 1Þ unknowns and M constraints.
Example 3: Imposing more constraints by creating a new variable. If Data Custodian A
collected the variable t, it could repeat the attack in Example 1 or 2 but where yi is replaced
with ynew;i ¼ yiti for all i. By imposing the additional constraint ynew;i ¼ 0 if ti ¼ 0, Data
Custodian A can focus on solving yi for only records with ti ¼ 1. This additional constraint
could considerably reduce the number of unknowns.
2.1.3. Counts
Consider if Data Custodian A regresses y on x ¼ xA and aims to infer T ¼ Sixi
0yi, which
are counts of y in the margins of x. Given b̂ and (1), this is straightforward since
T ¼ Sixi
0mi. The disclosure risks of frequency counts are well known (see, for example,
Shlomo 2007). Counts of one would lead to disclosure. Counts of one can also be obtained
through differencing, as discussed below.
2.1.4. Differencing
A standard differencing (see, for example, Gomatam et al. 2005; Shlomo 2007) attack
involves fitting the same model to two sets of records that are identical except that one
record is dropped from one of the sets. Data Custodian A can be sure only the target record
is dropped if the dropping condition uniquely identifies the record and if it collected all the
variables in the dropping condition. Differences in the estimated regression coefficients
from the two models can be used in an attempt to infer the values of the dropped record’s
variables.
Example 4: Differencing attack by dropping a record. Consider if Data Custodian A
wants to infer yr, the value of y for rth record. Data Custodian A can fit a linear regression
model with x ¼ xA before and after dropping the rth record. Denote the value of the
estimated regression coefficients before and after dropping the rth record by bo and boðrÞ,
respectively. Also denote yðrÞ and XðrÞ by y and X after removing the rth row, respectively.
Since Data Custodian A knows bo, boðrÞ, XðrÞ and X, it can calculate So ¼ X
0Xbo ¼ X
0y




ðrÞyðrÞ and take the difference SoðrÞ 2 So ¼ xr
0yr. Since yr is
the only unknown, Data Custodian A can infer it directly.
2.1.5. Fishing
Fishing attacks involve fitting two models that are only different in one small way. Of
interest is whether the two sets of coefficients are the same or whether they are different;
how the coefficients change is not of interest. An example is given below.
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Example 5: Fishing by slightly changing the definition of a variable. Consider linked
microdata where Data Custodian A collected a variable for small area geography and age
in single years and Data Custodian T collected a sensitive variable. Data Custodian A
would know if there was one record in a particular small area with age equal to 100 years
and may seek to infer the value of the sensitive characteristic for the record. Data
Custodian A could fit two models to the records in the small area which are exactly the
same, except that the first includes a binary covariate that takes the value one when age is
between 40 and 100 and the sensitive characteristic is present and the second model
includes a binary covariate that takes the value one when age is between 40 and 99 and
the sensitive characteristic is present. If the regression coefficients from these two models
are different, Data Custodian A infers that the 100-year-old has the condition; otherwise
Data Custodian A infers that the 100-year-old does not have the condition.
2.2. Estimated Variance of Regression Coefficients
The estimated variance of b̂ is ^Varðb̂;DÞ ¼ ðX 0V̂XÞ21, where V̂ is diagonal with ith
element v21 ›m=›h
 2
evaluated at x ¼ xi and b ¼ b̂, v is the variance function for the
model, and h ¼ x0b. Given b̂,^Varðb̂;DÞ can impose up to KðK 2 1Þ=2 constraints on X.
These constraints could be exploited to assist with an attack on estimated regression
coefficients. Consider the simple linear regression model where dVarðb̂;DÞ ¼ f̂ðX 0XÞ21
which, after taking the inverse and multiplying by released dispersion parameter f̂, gives














A. Many of the attacks in Subsection 2.1 (e.g.,
differencing attacks and fishing) can be used against dVarðb̂;DÞ. They are not discussed
further here.
2.3. Other Statistical Output
Regression analysis would normally include exploratory data analysis, use of test statistics
and graphical plots to assess the model fit. Univariate and multivariate exploratory
analysis involving binary variables will often involve frequency counts, which are well
known to be a disclosure risk (see references below). Such work goes beyond the scope of
this article, but will form the subject of future work.
Statistics used to assess model fit or goodness-of-fit (see Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000),
say t ¼ tðb̂;DÞ, are functions of the microdata D and an estimate of b. Again, many of
the attacks in Subsection 2.1 (e.g., differencing attacks and fishing) can be used against t.
They are not discussed further here.
Graphical diagnostics are frequently used to assess model fit. The disclosure risk of
plotting record-level values is high and has been considered by many authors (see O’Keefe
and Good 2009 and O’Keefe et al. 2012). Consider if a remote server releases b̂ and a plot
which shows that the predicted value for a record is p. Given x has only binary elements,
there will in general be only a single value of x such that p ¼ mðxÞ. Furthermore, if the
record has a unique value for xA on the linked microdata, then Data Custodian A can infer
xT for the person about which the record relates.
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3. Attacks in the Presence of Protections
This section proposes some simple protections against the attacks described in the
previous section. The objective of these protections is to significantly reduce the likelihood
of a successful attack while making a small impact on the utility of the analysis.
Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 consider protections by imposing a general set of restrictions and
by introducing uncertainty into regression coefficients, respectively. Subsection 3.3
considers attacks on estimated regression parameters in the presence of these protections.
Subsections 3.4 and 3.5 describe protections for the variance of the estimated regression
parameters and for diagnostic test statistics, respectively.
3.1. Protection: Imposing General Restrictions
Several restrictions are suggested below. These restrictions do not necessarily defend
against a particular attack, but are designed to significantly hinder attacks while resulting
in only a minor reduction in utility. When designing a set of restrictions to manage
disclosure risk, it quickly becomes clear that a series of legitimate regression models could
be indistinguishable from a sophisticated data attack. Therein lies the challenge: not
restricting the former while thwarting the latter. This challenge is discussed in detail by
Cox et al. (2011).
Some analysts may have good reasons for fitting a model which is not permitted by the
set of restrictions below. The IA could decide to relax some restrictions if: the analyst
promises to fit a small number of predefined models (this could be verified by the IA); if
the IA believes errors, such as incorrect or missed links, in the linked microdata provide
substantial protection; or if the analysis has high utility. For obvious reasons, the IA would
be more willing to relax restrictions for analysts who are not data custodians, as long as
they promise not to share the regression output publically.
If the IA is not willing to relax one or more restrictions so that an analyst may fit a
particular model, the IA may provide the analyst with an alternative mode of access to the
linked microdata. One example would be for the IA to provide the analyst with the C
counts required to fit the model, though the counts will almost certainly need to be
carefully perturbed to manage the risk of disclosure.
Some possible general restrictions include:
(a) Limit the number of model covariates, K, by imposing the restriction that K , 30.
Models with a large number of covariates may impose considerable constraints on
unknowns. In very few cases would legitimate analysis be impacted by this restriction.
(b) Impose a minimum number of observations or covariate patterns by imposing the
restrictions n $ 50 and C . 50. This restriction aims to ensure a minimum number of
unknowns. Remembering that C is the number of counts to which the model is fitted,
C # 2K effectively means that K . 5.
(c) Adjusted R 2 squared , 0:95 (see also Gomatam et al. 2005). Other cut-off values
can be considered. Inferential disclosure occurs when a model’s prediction of a
sensitive variable, y, is highly accurate and all covariates for the target record are
known (e.g., x ¼ xA). This restriction is designed to prevent inferential disclosure.
This protection will rarely be required since accurate predictions of binary outcomes
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are rare. (Aside: inferential disclosure is fundamentally based on model assumptions.
Some would argue that inferences which rely on model assumptions cannot lead
to disclosure, because there is uncertainty about whether the model assumptions
are true.)
(d) Each variable in the model must be non-zero for at least ten records. As all variables
are binary this means Sixik $ 10 and Sið1 2 xikÞ $ 10 for all k, Siyi $ 10 and
Sið1 2 yiÞ $ 10. This provides some protection against attacking a single estimating
Equation (see Example 2) by ensuring there will be a minimum of ten unknowns.
(e) ðC 2 CAÞ $ 10K. This ensures that there are ten times the number of unknown counts
than there are constraints imposed by the estimating equation.
(f) New variables may only be created by multiplying two variables originally on the
microdata as long as both variables were collected by the same data custodian. This
restriction aims to prevent a data custodian from, almost arbitrarily, reducing the
number of unknowns as in Example 3.
(g) Exclude variables from the linked file if they have limited analytic value. This limits
the potential prior knowledge a data custodian can use in attacks. This decision must
be made by the IA after consultation with potential analysts.
(h) Restrict variables which are naturally only useful as model covariates (e.g., marital
status, age, sex, geography) from being dependent variables. This will hamper
attempts to solve the estimating equation by changing the choice of dependent
variable (see point 1 in Subsection 2.1.2). See also Gomatam et al. 2005 for another
justification for this restriction.
It makes sense to impose data custodian-specific restrictions (e.g., see (e) above) because
the disclosure risk naturally depends upon which data custodian is performing the attack.
For data custodian-specific restrictions to make sense it must be assumed that there is
restricted (e.g., to publications) sharing of regression coefficients between data custodians
and that data custodians are aware of what regression coefficients they are able to share.
What if this assumption is not realistic? The implication is that if one data custodian
is restricted from fitting a model then all data custodians and non-data custodians must
be restricted from fitting the model. In other words – restriction for one means restriction
for all.
While the details are not within the scope of this article (for details see O’Keefe and
Chipperfield 2013), the IA will need to decide what restrictions, if any, to place on
subsetting records (i.e., defining the records inD). If there is no restriction on subsetting,
a data custodian may be able to arbitrarily target records to drop in differencing attacks.
On the other hand, the flexibility of subsetting is very important since it allows analysts
to make inferences about a specific population of interest.
If the number of models that are fitted is allowed to be arbitrarily high, the
corresponding set of constraints may be such that an attacking data custodian can solve the
estimating equation. Therefore it is worth mentioning a basic indicator of the risk of this
attack succeeding. Consider when Data Custodian A fits its mth model to CðmÞ counts,
where CðmÞ is the same as C but for the mth model and CAðmÞ is the same as CA but for the
mth model. Consider LA ¼ SmLAðmÞ, where LAðmÞ ¼ C
21
ðmÞCAðmÞ. The numerator of LAðmÞ is
the number of constraints Data Custodian A can impose on the CðmÞ counts (see point 2 in
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Subsection 2.1.1) to which the mth regression model was fitted. When LA . 1 there are
potentially more constraints than unknown counts, at which point the IA could perhaps
audit the models fitted by Data Custodian A. Refining this indicator and developing similar
indicators for other attacks would be an interesting line of future work.
3.2. Protection: Introducing Uncertainty into the Released Regression Coefficients
Two simple ways of introducing uncertainty into regression coefficients are now
mentioned. The first protection is that a different random sample of records is dropped (see
Sparks et al. 2008) for every distinct model that is fitted. Specifically, for each
k ¼ 1; : : : ;K, one record with xk ¼ 1 is randomly selected and dropped from D. This
means K records will be dropped. DenoteDdrop to beD after dropping records in this way.
Estimates of regression coefficients will not be biased by dropping records in this way,
since it does not affect the distribution of y conditional on x. As many applications
involving linked microdata have a large number of records, dropping records in this way
will generally only have a small impact on the accuracy of estimates. Note that dropping a
completely random sample of records for every model fitted (see Sparks et al. 2008)
provides limited protection in the present setting. Consider dropping 50 randomly selected
records as a protection against the attack in Example 2, where n ¼ 50,000 and H ¼ 5 so
that xk ¼ 1 for only five records. Since it is unlikely that xk ¼ 1 for any of the dropped
records, it is equally unlikely that the attack in Example 2 will be affected by dropping
records in this way.
The second protection involves adding noise (for a review see O’Keefe and Chipperfield
2013) to the RHS of (1). Consider the estimator b̂* of b, obtained by solving
Scðb;DdropÞ ¼ E
*; ð3Þ
where the microdata used in the regression areDdrop notD, E* ¼ ðE
*
1; : : : ;E
*






k , f is a scaling factor for the perturbation that needs to be set by the integrating
authority and u*k s are independently generated variables from the uniform distribution on
the range (21,1). Other distributions can be considered. The regression coefficients b̂ are
perturbed via E*. The value for f is best determined through empirical investigation and
simulation, which is discussed below. The distribution for u*k is bounded so that the impact
of perturbation is bounded. The contribution of a record to the kth estimating equation is
in the range (21,1), which is also the range of the perturbation, u*k . As many attacks attempt
to uncover the values of variables for a single record, this is arguably a minimum degree
of perturbation.
The distribution of the perturbations in E* are independent so that VarðE*Þ is a diagonal
matrix. The joint distribution of E* across different models should also be independent
with an important exception: the same values of E* should be used if exactly the same
model is fitted. This condition stops estimation of b̂ by fitting exactly the same model a
number of times and averaging over the b̂*s.
3.3. Attacks Using the Released Estimated Regression Coefficients
Here we revisit the attacks of Section 2 in the presence of the protections mentioned above.
It is assumed here that f and the rules for dropping records are in the public domain.
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3.3.1. Solving the Estimating Equation
Define b̂ ðmÞ* to be the same as b̂ ðmÞ except that it is obtained by solving (3) rather than (1).
Consider solving the estimating equation in Example 1 but where the regression
parameter, b̂ ðmÞ* instead of b̂ ðmÞ, is released. Define DðmÞdrop to be D after randomly
dropping records for the mth model. Data Custodian A’s attack now involves finding, over










for m ¼ 1; : : : ;M, where m̂*ðmÞi ¼ gðx
ðmÞ0
i b̂
*ðmÞÞ and 1 is a K vector of 1s.
The protection provided by perturbation and dropping records depends upon the many
possibly interacting factors implicit in (4). This makes it difficult to make any general
conclusions about the protections they provide against disclosure. Clearly, the protection
provided by perturbation is driven by f. When looking at (4), it is clear that as f increases
the interval becomes wider and the probability of a unique solution (i.e., disclosure)
becomes smaller. The method of dropping records would ideally prevent strict constraints
being imposed on the terms in (4). If y ¼ 1 for 99% of records, then an attack could
assume, with high probability of being correct, that y ¼ 1 for all dropped records.
Making this assumption would impose a further constraint on the unknown values of y –





i in (4) would be constant over m. The first element of A could no
longer be assumed to be constant if there was some uncertainty about how many records
were dropped (e.g., instead of dropping one randomly selected record with xk ¼ 1, drop
1; 2; : : : ; or T randomly selected records with xk ¼ 1 with probability 1=T).
3.3.2. Counts
Consider how b̂* protects against estimating T ¼ Si[Dx
0
i yi. If Data Custodian A regresses
y on x ¼ xA, it can compute T̂* ¼ Si[Dxim̂
*





*Þ. Data Custodian A
knows the minimum and maximum value for the counts in T are given by the
corresponding elements of Tmin ¼ T̂* 2 ðfþ KÞ1 and Tmax ¼ T̂* þ f1, respectively.
The ‘K’ in the expression for Tmin reflects the fact that Data Custodian A knows that up to
K records could be dropped from each estimating equation.
3.3.3. Differencing
Consider how perturbation protects against differencing attacks on counts (see Example 4),
assuming for the moment that no records are randomly dropped (i.e., Ddrop ¼ D).
Consider if Data Custodian A regresses y on x ¼ xA before and after dropping the rth













ðrÞ to be exactly the same as D, T, T̂
* and b̂*, respectively,
except that they are computed after the rth record is dropped. Data Custodian A can
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If any element of DðrÞ has magnitude greater than 2f, Data Custodian A can infer that
yr ¼ 1. It is also not hard to see that if yr ¼ 0 this differencing attack will never succeed.
This means the success rate of this attack depends upon the probability that y ¼ 1 for the
target records. It is also not hard to see that, as K increases and f decrease, the probability
of this attack succeeding increases.
Now consider the same differencing attack but where records are randomly dropped, as
discussed previously. DenoteDðrÞdrop to be the result of randomly dropping records from
DðrÞ. Now b̂* and b̂
*
ðrÞ are calculated from Ddrop and DðrÞdrop instead of D and DðrÞ,
respectively. Of course, the IA does not reveal which records are dropped so thatDðrÞdrop
andDdrop are not known to Data Custodian A. Accounting for this uncertainty, it is easy to
show if any element of DðrÞ has magnitude greater than 2fþ K (the difference between
Tmin and Tmax), Data Custodian A can infer that yr ¼ 1.
3.3.4. Fishing
Randomly dropping records as described above provides an effective protection against
fishing attacks since, for every distinct model that is fitted, a different random sample of
records is dropped. This will mean, continuing with Example 5, that the regression
coefficients for the two models will be different whether or not the 100-year-old has the
condition. Only if the same model is fitted repeatedly (i.e., the chosen link function, the set
of records, and dependent and independent variables are all the same) should the same set
of records be dropped. Otherwise this protection can be removed by averaging.
3.4. Variance of Estimated Regression Coefficients
Given the perturbation and model distributions are independent, the sandwich estimator











The first term in (6) is the estimated variance of the standard estimator of b obtained from





0V̂X but based on Ddrop rather than D. Alternatively
the first term can be calculated fromDdrop using the Bootstrap or Jackknife (see Chambers
and Skinner 2003 p. 105). The second term in (6) measures the variation due to
perturbation where it is easy to show, using the variance of the Uniform distribution, that
Var*ðE
*Þ is diagonal with kth element var*ðfu
*
kÞ ¼ f
2=3. The analyst can make valid
inferences about b using b̂* and (6), without knowing anything about the perturbation
itself. It is interesting to note that the first and second terms of (6) are Oðn21Þ and Oðn22Þ
respectively, which means that the impact of perturbation on variance is small.
Using the same reasoning as in Subsection 2.2, releasing (6), where the first term is
computed analytically, would represent a high risk of disclosure. Instead consider
computing the first term using the Jackknife. Denote u as the analytic variance estimate of
b̂ and denote û as the corresponding Jackknife variance estimate of u. The Jackknife
estimate has a level of uncertainty due to the process, denoted by v, of allocating selection
units to replicate groups. In particular, the coefficient of variation of û due to this process is
CVv û
 
< 2ðR 2 1Þ21, where R is the number of replicate groups, CVvðûÞ ¼ VarðûÞû22
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(see Shao and Tu 1995, p. 196) and m=n is negligible. As long as R is not too large, this
uncertainty in û will mask u. This means that computing the first term in (6) using the
Jackknife will mask the entire RHS of (6). For example, if the Jackknife standard error
estimate is 0.2 and is based on R ¼ 50, a 95% confidence interval for the estimate is
ð0:31; 0:46Þ.
It is difficult to see how (6) could be used in a differencing attack or be used to impose
any constraint that would be useful to help solve the estimating equation. Since (6) is based
on Ddrop it is protected from fishing attacks. A further protection is to release only
the diagonal elements of (6) so that only the variances of the regression coefficients are
released.
3.5. Other Statistical Output
Given b̂* instead of b̂ is released, it makes sense that an analyst would be interested in
t * ¼ tðb̂*;DdropÞ rather than t. The statistic t * for the adjusted R
2, leverage, dispersion
parameter and the Hosmer Lemeshow and chi-squared statistics will have their usual
interpretation (i.e., replacing b̂ and D with b̂* and Ddrop does not affect their
interpretation).
Since b̂* is not a likelihood estimator, it is not strictly valid for b̂* to be used to evaluate
likelihood-based diagnostic statistics. However, it is easy to show that it is approximately
valid to do so in large samples. Standard likelihood-based test statistics (e.g., Likelihood
Ratio Test and Deviance Test) involve evaluating the model log-likelihood lðb̂jDÞ, where
b̂ is the standard ML estimator and D are the microdata used to fit the model. Using a
second order Taylor Series approximation to lðbjDÞ centred around b̂ and noting
b̂* ¼ b̂þ ðX 0V̂XÞ21E*, it follows that lðb̂*jDÞ < lðb̂jDÞ2 321trace{ðX 0V̂XÞ21} which
means for large n that lðb̂*jDÞ < lðb̂jDÞ. Furthermore, if the number of dropped records
is small then lðb̂*jDDropÞ < lðb̂jDÞ. For large n, this means that a standard likelihood-
based test statistic evaluated at b̂* and Ddrop is approximately the same as a standard
likelihood test statistic (i.e., t * < t). This approximation is verified in empirical
evaluations.
In small samples, it may be worthwhile to adjust some statistics to make them valid.
For example, the standard Wald Test statistic is tW ¼ b̂
0ðX 0V̂XÞ21b and is distributed as















and is chi-squared with K degrees of freedom.
The only protection of t * from attacks is that it is calculated fromDdrop rather thanD.
To be consistent with the protections given to regression parameters (see Subsection 3.2),
consider the perturbed statistic
t ** ¼ t * þ eðtÞu*; ð7Þ
where eðtÞ bounds the maximum influence that a record on the microdata has on the
statistic t, and u* is a random variable sampled from the uniform distribution on the range
(21,1). If the same model is fitted then the same value for u* must be generated (cf.
averaging over E* s). All the attacks discussed previously on regression parameters can be
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reformulated to be attacks on diagnostic statistics, t **. For reasons of space these are
not mentioned.
For example, in the case of the dispersion parameter for a logistic regression, ideally
f̂* ¼ ðn 2 KÞ21Sið yi 2 m
*
i Þ
2v21ðm̂*i Þ would be released. Since eðfÞ < n
21, the released
dispersion parameter f** ¼ f* þ eðfÞu* ¼ f* þ Oðn21Þ, which means that perturbation
will only have a small impact. Moreover, it is easy to show, using first-order Taylor Series
approximations, that for many test statistics t ** ¼ t þ Oðn21Þ – implying that the
difference between the standard and released statistics will be small. This is verified in a
limited empirical study.
For statistics used in hypothesis testing, only the ranged p-value for the test statistic, t **,
should be reported, rather than the value of the test statistic and the degrees of freedom.
The degrees of freedom for t and t ** for the above mentioned test statistics are the same,
using as justification the fact that f** < f. Sparks et al. (2008) suggest reporting the
p-values in the ranges ½0; 0:001Þ, ½0:001; 0:01Þ, ½0:01; 0:05Þ, ½0:05; 0:1Þ and ½0:1; 1Þ.
The challenge of confidentialising graphical output, including exploratory data analysis,
in remote analysis systems is discussed by Sparks et al. (2008) and by many other authors
(for a review see O’Keefe and Chipperfield 2013). This however, has not considered the
risks from linked data. This is an interesting and useful avenue for future work.
4. Evaluation of Risk and Utility of a Remote Server: Linking the Australian
Census to the Migrants Database
The ABS Census of Population and Housing provides economic and social information
about migrants living in Australia. However, there are certain questions of great interest
about migrants that the Census data alone cannot answer. One key question is how migrant
visa class, assigned prior to arrival in Australia, is related to post-arrival social and
economic outcomes. The different visa classes include family, humanitarian, skilled,
onshore and other. Answering such a question is made possible through linking the Census
with the Department of Immigration and Citizenships (DIAC) Settlement Database (SDB)
which collects visa class. These answers would assist with the future development and
evaluation of immigration programs and support services for migrants.
The Census 2006 microdata are made up of more than 20 million records. The reference
period for the Census is 8 August 2006. For this study, the SDB had a reference period
from 1 January 2000 to 8 August 2006 (Census night) and contained the records of
861,000 persons who, during that period, were granted visas to live permanently in
Australia. DIAC provided the SDB to the ABS for the purpose of linking it with the
Census. The variables used to probabilistically link records on the SDB and Census were
age (in years), month and day of birth, marital status (five categories), sex, country of
birth, year of arrival, religion, main language and small area geography. About 530,000
records were linked. For the purposes of this study, the linked file includes select Census
variables, the SDB variable visa class and the linking variables age, marital status, sex,
country of birth, year of arrival, main language and small area geography. For the purpose
of this study we assumed that the linking variables religion and month and day of birth
were not included on the linked data. This means DIAC would have access to seven
variables and small area geographic information on the linked microdata. If more SDB
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variables were included on the linked microdata, the disclosure risk would likely be
greater than that measured below.
In this study the ABS is the IA and Data Custodian T and DIAC is Data Custodian A.
The ABS, as an IA, is planning to release the SDB Census-linked microdata through its
remote server. The ABS is legally obliged to ensure that the risk of disclosing information
about a particular person is unlikely. This legislation (Census and Statistics Act 1905) does
not distinguish between sensitive and nonsensitive variables and does not make a special
provision for trusted analysts. (The case study here is an example of a general strategy
of the ABS to link its Population Census to microdata collected by select government
departments. Details on the legal framework behind an IA in Australia can be found on the
ABS website).
Subsection 4.1 considers the utility of modelling with and without the protections of
Section 3, and Subsection 4.2 considers the disclosure risk in a high-risk scenario.
4.1. Empirical Evaluation of Utility
While there are many possible research questions, one of particular importance to policy
makers is to what extent migrants have difficulty finding employment after they arrive in
Australia and how this is related to visa class. A useful way to answer such a question is to
fit a regression model to employment with a range of covariates, including visa class.
Tables 1 and 2 give the results of fitting such a model to two populations- the first is all
migrants living in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the second is all migrants
living in the ACT who arrived after 2001, respectively. The set of restrictions of
Subsection 3.2 did not prevent the models being fitted.
The results show that b̂* with f ¼ 1 (remembering that f controls the magnitude of the
perturbation) and the standard estimator b̂ were very similar. As mentioned above, the
standard errors of b̂* can be computed by using either an analytic or Jackknife expression
for the first term in (6). Tables 1 and 2 show that the difference between the two variance
estimates is generally small and tends to be larger for coefficients of covariates that have a
low frequency. Consequently, the tests for the statistical significance of the regression
coefficients were almost identical whether they were based on b̂* with Jackknife standard
errors or b̂ with analytic standard errors. The one exception was in Table 1, where the
coefficient 55 , age , 64 was not statistically significant at the 95% level after the
protections were applied. Coefficients of covariates with a low frequency tend to be more
influenced by perturbation of the score function. Tables 3 and 4 illustrate that the standard
and released diagnostics statistics are very similar. Overall, this section illustrates that the
protections had only a small impact on inference.
4.2. Simulated Evaluation of Risks
This section simulates attacks that could be conducted by an analyst with access to the
SDB. The aim of such simulated attacks is to infer the value of one or more Census
variables, using statistical output released by the remote server and the SDB. While the
simulation does not involve use of the DIAC Census-linked microdata, it aims to replicate
the possible attacks on the linked microdata. The benefit of simulation is that it is
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possible to readily construct a situation that both is realistic and presents a high risk of
disclosure.
The ABS, as an IA, would not reveal to data custodians which records were linked (e.g.,
in the Census-SDB linkage only 530,000 of the 861,000 SDB records were linked).
However, it is assumed in this simulation that the attacker could identify a specific
subpopulation of records that are very likely to be linked correctly. For example, in the
Census-SDB linkage it may be inferred that certain subpopulations of records (e.g.,
proficient in English and high level of education) have a very high chance of reliably
reporting linking variables, and so are likely to be linked correctly to their corresponding
Census records.
4.2.1. Simulated Subpopulation
Assume the attacker fits models to a subpopulation of the linked microdata of size n ¼ 30
or 50 records. This subpopulation could be defined in terms of small area geography,
available on the SDB. Given the previous assumption, the attacker knows the exact set of
records in the subpopulation. To make this simulation realistic, the attacker chooses to use
eight variables on the linked microdata: small area geography to define the subpopulation
of size n, the six other remaining SDB variables (see above), denoted by x, and one Census
variable (e.g., employment), denoted by y. In the notation of Section 2, the attacker knows
X and seeks to infer yi for some or all i. The variables for records in the subpopulation were
independently generated 200 times in the following way:
. Each record has a unique covariate pattern in x. Since x has dimension six, there are
26 ¼ 64 possible covariate patterns, of which n ¼ 30 or 50 are randomly selected for
the subpopulation.
. Sy ¼ Siyi ¼ 3; 6 where y is generated from the logistic model 1=ðexpð2hiÞÞ,
hi ¼ 1:6þ x1i 2 1:5x2i þ 1:3x3i 2 0:8x4i þ 1:3x5i þ 0:9x6i þ ei and the ei s are
independent standard normal random variables. These model parameters were chosen
arbitrarily but to be within the range of those in Tables 1 and 2 and to generate the
desired range in Sy.
Table 4. Impact of Statistical Disclosure Control on Diagnostic Statistics (ACT and
Year of Arrival Prior to 2001)
Statistic Standard (t) 95% interval for t **
Dispersion, f 0.93 (0.91, 0.94)
R 2 square 0.18 (0.18, 0.19)
Likelihood Ratio 257 (,0.001) (240, 261) (,0.001)c
conly the ranged p-value is released.
Table 3. Impact of Statistical Disclosure Control on Diagnostic Statistics (ACT)
Statistic Standard (t) 95% interval for t **
Dispersion, f 0.93 (0.92, 0.93)
R 2 square 0.18 (0.18, 0.18)
Likelihood Ratio 1052 (,0.001) (1035, 1057) (,0.001)c
conly the ranged p-value is released.
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Since each value for x is unique and SDB contains the name and address for every
record, disclosure automatically occurs if the attacker who has access to the SDB is able to
infer the value of yi for any xi. This is because there is a 1-1 correspondence between xi
and name and address for all i.
The ABS releases frequency counts from its Census microdata via its remote server.
While a small amount of noise is added to these counts before they are released, it is
frequently assumed in this simulation that Sy is in the public domain. This is a strong
assumption since, as mentioned above, such counts are perturbed by a small amount.
In reality, it is unlikely all of the above conservative assumptions made for this
simulation will be true. As a result, the disclosure risks would in reality be significantly
lower than those measured in this section.
4.2.2. Attacks Using Regression Coefficients
The effectiveness of two attacks were measured on the 200 independently simulated
subpopulations. It was interesting to see how the success of an attack was influenced by
whether the remote server released:
. b̂. This effectively means there is no (N) protection.
. b̂*ðDÞ computed from (3) but using D instead of Ddrop. The protection is from
perturbation (P) of the score function.
. b̂*ðDdropÞ computed from (3). The protection is from perturbation and dropping a
single randomly selected record (O,P), where O denotes dropping.
The first attack was Solving the Estimating Equation (SEE) (see Example 1 and
Subsection 3.3). When the remote server uses the O and P protections, SEE involved
finding all possible values for y that are solutions to (4) given Sy, X and b̂*
ðmÞ for
m ¼ 1; : : : ;M. Disclosure occurred for record j if, across all possible solutions, the
value for yj was always unique. Table 5 gives the proportion of SEE attacks that were
successful in a range of scenarios. For example, Table 5 shows that when n ¼ 50 and
there were no protections, all values in y were disclosed in every one of the 200
simulated subpopulations from only a single model; if instead the P protection was used
with f ¼ 1, the success rate fell to 2%. A summary of the findings from Table 5 are
described below.
. Releasing b̂ was a high disclosure risk. The risk was 100% when y was the dependent
variable.
. As f increased the success rate reduced. However, the P protection on its own did not
reduce the success rate to zero.
. The success rate increased as M, the number of fitted models, increased.
. The O protection on its own did not reduce the success rate.
. If only the P protection was used, uncertainty in Sy (see 6c in Table 5) did not seem to
provide much protection.
. If both the P and O protections were used, the disclosure risk was zero.
The second attack was Differencing Counts (DC) (see Subsection 2.1.3 and
Subsection 3.3). The target record for a differencing attack was chosen completely at
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random. Table 6 shows that the proportion of differencing attacks that were successful
when protections N, P and (P and O) were used was 100%, 5% and 0% respectively.
For the results in Table 5, LDIAC ¼ 0:5 (see Subsection 3.1 where A ¼ DIAC) for fitting
a single model and LDIAC ¼ 3:5 when seven models were fitted. By contrast, for the
models in Tables 1 and 2, LDIAC ¼ 0:001 and 0.002 respectively; these values are
considerably smaller since most variables in the model were not SDB variables and the
sample size was larger. Interesting further work would identify the optimal value for LDIAC
to trigger an audit by the ABS. If LDIAC . 1 was to trigger such an audit, the audit would
readily identify that the fitted models have the distinctive feature of the SEE attack (see
Subsection 2.1.2). Remedial action could then be taken by DIAC and ABS to prevent
further attacks.
The ABS, as an IA, could consider dropping variables from the linked microdata that
are common to Census and SDB. If a common variable has limited analytic value, the
ABS, as the IA, should consider dropping it from the linked microdata. This is particularly
the case if a common variable is useful in uniquely identifying a record. Dropping such
variables will limit the prior knowledge, and hence the effectiveness, of an attack.
5. Discussion
Modern advances have allowed vast amounts of microdata to be collected by data
custodians. With increasing sophistication of policy makers and the consequent demand
for more detail, linking such microdata across data custodians is becoming increasingly
important. While the benefits to society of allowing access to linked microdata are
significant, data custodians need to ensure that allowing access is unlikely to result in the
disclosure of information about a particular person or organisation. The Australian Bureau
of Statistics (ABS) is playing a lead role in developing a framework for the integration of
Australian Commonwealth data. The role of an Integrating Authority (IA) is to maximise
the inherent value of Commonwealth data to society, to facilitate access to the linked data
and to ensure disclosure risk is acceptable. The ABS is developing infrastructure in the
areas of record linkage and remote analysis to support its goal to become the lead IA
in Australia.
This article proposes a set of protections that an IA can apply to statistical output from
linked microdata. The evaluations show that the protections prevent disclosure in a high-
risk scenario and have only a small impact on inferences for analysis involving moderate
sample sizes. The method in the article can be readily extended to three or more data
custodians. Importantly, this article shows that some popular protections against
disclosure (e.g., dropping records, rounding regression coefficients or imposing
restrictions on model selection) are perhaps not as effective as previously thought.
Table 6. Differencing Attack
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There is a need to extend the approach here to include analysis of continuous variables.
Extensions to multilevel models is also important, since linked administrative data are
often longitudinal in nature or contain a natural hierarchy.
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